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L STATKi\U:NT OF THE

A. Nature of the Casc.

This case is the second lawsuit arising out of a dispute in Pocatello, Idaho. The
plantiftirespondent, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Centers, LLC (PM C), and
Quail Ridgc Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge), were involved in prior litigation that
concluded in a court trial and an appeal. l Here, PMC filed a Complaint alleging breach of
contract against two defendants: Quail Ridge and its principle, Forrest Preston (Preston). The
defendants filed an Answer and Jury Demand. The defendants asserted affirmative defenses and
included res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the outcome of PMC l. PMC, Quail Ridge,
and Preston filed motions for summary judgment. The district court heard argument on the
motions for summary judgment on October 21,2013. The district court granted PMC's motion
for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion. This appeal followed.
B. Course of Proceedings

PMC filed its Complaint against Quail Ridge and Preston on December 12,2013. (R Vol.
I, pp. 9-17.) Quail Ridge and Preston filed ajoint Answer and Jury Demand on January 29, 2013.

(Id., pp. 20-24.) Quail Ridge and Preston requested a stay to the proceedings while PMC I
proceeded on appeaL (Id., pp. 25-33.) The district court stayed the proceedings but predicated the
stay on the posting of a bond. The bond was not posted and the district court vacated the stay.
PMC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents on September 5,
l The first lawsuit was appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court as Docket No. 40566-2012. It was argued on February
12,2014, and the case is presently under advisement with the Court. The case will be referred to as PMC 1.
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2013. (R Vol. I, pp. 338-39.) PMC filed a motion requesting attorney

Quail Ridge and Preston opposed the motion, and the Court granted the motion on January

8,2014. (Id., pp. 41

1.) Quail Ridge and Preston timely appealed. (Id., pp. 394-97.)

C. Statement of Facts.
PMC is a Delaware LLC licensed and authorized to do business within the state of Idaho.
(R Vol. 1, pp. 9-1

Quail Ridge is a Tennessee

licensed and authorized to do business

within the state of Idaho. (Id., pp. 20-24.) Preston is a principle owner of Quail Ridge. (Id.)
Quail Ridge is an assisted living facility located in Pocatello, Idaho. The assisted living
center building is located on approximately 4.25 acres in Pocatello, Idaho. The Ground Lease
Agreement for the facility's real property is the subject of PMC 1. PMC is the owner and lessor
of the property and Quail Ridge is the lessee.
As this Court is aware from PMC I, the Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27,
1983, governs the parties' respective relationship, in part. The Ground Lease Agreement calls for
a triennial adjustment to the rent paid by the lessee pursuant to Section 1.3(b) ofthe Ground
Lease Agreement (Id., p. 230.) In PMC I, PMC sued Quail Ridge and Century Park Associates,
LLC (Century Park) for breach of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. (Id., pp. 218-50.) PMC
specifically alleged in PMC I that Quail Ridge and Century Park both owed adjusted rent for a
variety of rent adjustment periods, including the 2010 adjustment period. (ld.)

Appellant Brief 6

a
two

&

16,81

10.

against Quail Ridge and Century Park for

ustmcnt

to be awarded

2010 adjustment period. (ld., p. 262.)

The parties tried PMC Ito the district court on May 14-15,2012. (ld., p. 264-68.) In
PMC I, the evidence established that the parties restructured their relationship in 2001. (ld., pp.
271

In 2001, Sterling Development sought to sell the property subject to the Ground Lease

Agreement. (ld.) Preston, Quail Ridge's owner, wanted to buy the building. (lei.) Sterling's
to be released from their

Lease

and

wanted Sterling released 1rom the financing on the building. (Id.) Sterling owed approximately
$2.8 million on the building. (ld.) The 2001 restructure resulted in Quail Ridge stepping into
Sterling's shoes vis-a.-vis the Ground Lease Agreement. (Id.) The parties amended and restated
the old sublease with Quail Ridge becoming the sublessor and another entity, Pocatello Medical
Investors LP, remained as subtenant. (ld.) Among other various additions, Preston executed the
personal guarantee during the 2001 restructuring. (Id.)
On May 15,2012, at the close of PMC's case, Quail Ridge and Century Park's attorneys
moved for directed verdict. (ld., p. 265.) The motion requested that the district court dismiss
Count I (breach of contract) of the Amended Complaint. (Id., p. 265, 270.) PMC's attorneys
responded to the motion as follows:
MR. HAWKINS: I can probably stipulate on this and save a little time. I agree exactly
with what Mr. Gaffney is saying. That hasn't been our strategy in the triaL We feel that
the way we have alleged the complaint, and especially with the amendment for the
declaratory judgment, which effectively becomes the adjustment process that we're
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parties and found that PMC had

opportunity to present evidence of breach of contract and that it did not present any evidence of
breach of contract for the 2007 and

10 rent adjustment periods. (Id., pp. 265,270.) The distriet

court granted the directed verdict motion and dismissed the breach of contract claim seeking rent
for past (2007) and

n""'C'P1U

withdrawal of the
court

a directed

(2010) adjustment periods. (ld) The distric court did not allow the
contract claim and instead dismissed the claim. (ld.) The district
YYln.n",., "'.'':>11eU''''1115

Century Park out of the case.

p.265.)

During post-trial proceedings, Judge Brown expressly found that PMC presented no
evidence that Quail Ridge had breached the terms of the Ground Lease Agreement. (ld., pp. 27377.) Judge Brown stated that there were no facts in the record that would justify entering a
money judgment in favor ofPMC. (lei.) Judge Brown signed an Amended Declaratory Judgment
on November 26, 2012. (ld, pp. 141-43.)
After Judge Brown issued his Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law in PMC I and
signed the Amended Declaratory Judgment, PMC filed a second lawsuit once more alleging
breach of contract against Quail Ridge and Preston for the 2010 adjustment period. (ld., pp. 917.) PMC aUeged that due to Judge Brown's findings and conclusions in PlvlC !that it was
entitled to payment of the $416,812.50 identified in the Amended Declaratory Judgment. (lel.)
PMC also sought to enforce Preston's personal guarantee. (ld.)
Both parties moved for summary judgment in Fall 2013. PMC argued that there were no
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to have the case dismissed based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

(lei., pp. 201-77.) After hearing oral argument on October

2013, Judge Robert C. Naftz

granted PMC's motion for summary judgment and denied Quail Ridge/Preston's cross-motion.

(lei., pp. 338-39.) Judge Naftz awarded pre-judgment interest to PMC and also granted PMC
attorney fees and costs in the amount of$16,830.93. ([d., pp. 413-19.)
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Whether the district court erred granting PMC's summary judgment motion.
B. Whether the district court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs to PMC.

III. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL: ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Quail Ridge and Preston assert that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs in the
event that they prevail on this appeal. They would be the overall prevailing party in this litigation
if the matter is reversed and remanded to the district court. As set forth in the Argument section,

infra, Quail Ridge and Preston are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code
Sections 12-120(3) & 12-121. Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules allows for fees on appeaL
IDAHO R. App. 41 (2013).
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A. Standard of Review

In

Groot v. ,)'tandley

14 WL 1

(Idaho Mar.

the

Court outlined the standard of review following a grant of summary judgment. The Court wrote:
An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district court
uses when granting a motion for summary judgment. Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho
judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and
Rules of Civil Procedure,
admissions on
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment
should be granted. In making this determination, all disputed facts are liberally construed
in favor of the non-moving party. Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of
material fact. Inferences that can reasonably be made from the record are made in favor
of the non-moving party. However, the non-moving party may not rest on a mere scintilla
of evidence. If
record raises neither a question of witness credibility nor requires
weighing the evidence, then summary judgment should be granted. The moving party is
entitled to jUdgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case. Parkwest Homes, LLC
v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678, 682, 302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
[d. at *3. "The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not
change the applicable standard of review, and this Court must evaluate each party's motion on its
own merits." Intermountain Forest Mgmt.} Inc. v. La. Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235,31 P.3d
921,923 (2001) (citing Stqfford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119
(2000)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal from summary judgment. Steel Farms,
Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 264, 297 P.3d 222,227 (2012).
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2010 adjustment period, went to trial on that

to

failed to present

evidence supporting the claim, and then had that claim dismissed on directed verdict.
Unsatisfied, PMC sued Quail Ridge again tor breach of contract tor the 2010 adjustment period.
The second action is entirely based on the failure to pay adjusted rent tor the 2010 adjustment
period. Res judicata and collateral estoppel specifically exist to preclude repetitive lawsuits on
or substantially related claims. The district court erred by granting summary
judgment to PMC against Quail Ridge and Preston.
Res judicata "includes two legal concepts-issue preclusion or collateral estoppel and
claim preclusion." Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943,951 (Idaho 2012).
"Claim preclusion 'bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or
upon claims relating to the same cause of action. '" Id. The Court wrote:
Under this doctrine [of res judicata], a claim is also precluded if it could have been
brought in the previous action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1)
the original action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves
the same parties as the original action, and (2) (sic) the present claim arises out of the
same transaction or series of transactions. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 12527, 157 P.3d 613, 618-20 (2007).

Id. The Berkshire Investments, LLC court described collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, as
applying to cases when:
(1) The party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue
sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final
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res
claims

PMCs

this casco Summary judgment was improvidently entered in favor of PMC and the case

should be reversed and remanded for dismissal.

C. Res judicata applies to the bre:lch of contract claim against Quail Ridge.
1. There was a final judgment on the merits in PMC t.
The tirst clement of res judicata requires that there be a final judgment on the merits of
the case. Berkshire Invs .. LLC, 278 P.3d at 951. Here, in PMC /, the dismissal of the breach of
contract claim by Judge Brown after a motion for directed

was a full and complete

adjudication of the breach of contract claim for the 2010 rent adjustment period. (R Vol. I, pp.
265,270,273-77.) The district court dismissed the claim without qualification. (Id.) The district
court entered the dismissal after PMC had its full opportunity to present evidence in suppOli of
the claim. (ld.) In ShOli, given the fact that there were no qualifications placed upon the dismissal
of the claim and in light of the Amended Declaratory Judgment entered by the Court resolving
the sole remaining claim, i.e., the claim for declaratory reliet: the judgment in PMe I was final
and on the merits. Indeed, Quail Ridge appealed the outcome of PMe I to this Court from the
Amended Declaratory Judgment. Had the Amended Declaratory Judgment not been final this
2

Court would not have allowed the PMe I appeal to proceed. Therefore, the first requirement of
res judicata is present in this case.

PMC did not appeal the dismissal of the breach of contract claims in PMe I nor could it have appealed because
PMC stipulated to the dismissal ofthe claim on directed verdict.

2
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case. Quail

and PMC were parties to PMC 1. In PMC l, the Court entered an Amended Declaratory
Judgment in favor of PMC and against Quail Ridge. (R Vol. I, pp. 141-43.) Thus, the second
requirement of res judicata is satisfied here.
The case does involve a party that was not a party to PlvfC I: Preston. Preston's presence
as a party in this litigation does not militate against applying res judicata. Res judicata still
claim against Preston

out of

same

of

3. The breach of contract claim arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions that involved in PMC I.
The district court erred in not applying res judicata because both PMC 1 and this case
involve identical claims for breach of contract for the 2010 rent adjustment period. In PMe l,
PMC specifically alleged that Quail Ridge had breached the contract by failing to pay adjusted
rent in the amount of $416,812.50 for the 2010 rent adjustment period. (ld., pp. 255-63.) Here,
PMC sued Quail Ridge for breaching the contract by failing to pay $416,812.50 for the 2010 rent
adjustment period. (ld., pp. 9-17.) The claims are the same in both cases. Therefore, the COUl1
does not even need to analyze this case under the same series of transactions framework. It is the
same transaction being sued upon by PMC. The claims are the same.
This lawsuit was not an action to enforce a judgment. PMC did not seek a judgment on a
judgment. PMC sued Quail Ridge for breach of contract for the 2010 rent adjustment period. In
granting PMC's motion, Judge Naftz acknowledged that the case was one for breach of contract
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not
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cases are
of contract

I.PMC

to do so.

judicata applies to all claims that could were or could have been brought. Berkshire
lnvs., LLe, 153 Idaho at 81, 278 P.3d at 951. PMC initially sought relief under the breach of

contract theory and only added the declaratory relief claim as an afterthought before triaL
Though PMC could bring an action for declaratory relief prior to breach of an agreement it also
to bring the claim for breach of contract at the same time. This was a claim that should
brought irrespective of the declaratory

claim. In

v.

County,681

P .2d 988 (Idaho 1984), the Idaho Supreme Court held "that the right sought to be protected by
declaratory judgment 'may invoke either remedial or preventive relief; it may relate to a right
that has either been breached or is only yet in dispute or a status undisturbed but threatened or
endangered; but, in either or any event, it must involve actual or existing facts. '" Id. at 991-92
(citing State ex rei. Miller v. State Bd. of Educ., 52 P.2d 141, 144 (Idaho 1935)). PMC asserted
its breach of contract claim in P MC I and failed to adduce evidence supporting the claim. The
dismissal of the breach claim resolved whether Quail Ridge had breached the Ground Lease
Agreement by not paying the alleged adjusted rent for the 2010 rent adjustment period.
Alternatively, PMC could have bifurcated its claims and had Judge Brown first declare
the rights of the parties after a trial. In PMC I, PMC chose to proceed with all of its claims,
including the claim for breach of contract for the 2010 rent adjustment period, rather than
holding the breach of contract claim in abeyance while the district court decided the declaratory
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contract

to
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made poor strategic and
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it
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decisions in

the breach 0 f contract claims without any evidence 0 f breach. Hence,

Judge Brown dismissed the claim. If PMC believed that the breach of contract claim was unripe
then it should have bifurcated or held the claim in abeyance while the declaratory relief claim
was adjudicated. The judge could have held a separate proceeding at the appropriate time to
decide

breach

contract

court

reality is that PMC tried its case, lost, and the district
res

See,

Mining Co. v.

State, 280 P.3d 679, 682-83 (Idaho 2012). The Court should reverse and remand with an order
for the district court to dismiss this action with prejudice.

4. No new sets of facts give rise to a new claim.
In rendering its oral decision on summary judgment, the district court articulated its basis
for the ruling as follows:
I think it's pretty clear that this is an action on a breach of contract case. Judge Brown
issued his decision. A new set of facts arose, and based on that, a breach of the contract
action was filed. The Court's decision in this matter is to grant PMC summary judgment
because of the - because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Court can find.
By failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent from the 2010 rent adjustment period
determined by Judge Brown, Quail Ridge breached its obligation under the ground lease
agreement.
Further, summary judgment for PMC is appropriate against Forest (sic) Preston because
there is no genuine issue of material fact that by failing to pay Quail Ridge's outstanding
obligations under the ground lease, Mr. preston is in breach of his obligation as a
personal guarantee.

It is clear to me that the action is ripe for summary judgment here, and I am going to
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court was

claim all of the way through trial. If the breach claim was not ripe, then PMC should have
obtained a dismissal without prejudice or some other relief. The claim was brought and the issue
of breach tor the 2010 rent adjustment period was fully adjudicated in PMe l.
Though it is unclear from the district court's oral ruling deciding the case, it appears to
have relied upon the reasoning articulated by the Court in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104
Idaho

1,663 P.2d 287 (1983). PMC relied on Duthie, for its argument that the claim was not

ripe for adjudication during PMC 1. There are several problems with PMC's argument and the
district court erred by relying upon those arguments. This case is not Duthie.
If the claim was not ripe in PMC I then PMC should not have brought the claim. PMC
should not have chosen to try its case while asserting the breach of contract claim. Doing so
subjected the claim to the jurisdiction of the district court and subjected it to potential, and
actual, dismissal after the presentation of the evidence. As discussed, supra, PMC could have
done many things differently to preserve the breach of contract claim and avoid a direct verdict
during PMC 1. PMC could have sought a voluntary dismissal of the claim or could have
requested to hold the claim in abeyance until after the declaratory relief action. PMC chose not to
do so and instead placed the 2010 rent adjustment period squarely at issue during the lawsuit.

Duthie is factually distinct from this case. Duthie constituted the second litigation
between the parties over the Duthies' right to connect their residence to the Gun Club's domestic
water line. Id, 104 Idaho at 752,663 P.2d at 288. The Gun Club initially sued the Duthies for
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a
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conclusion of
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case,

Gun

cut

waterline, after which the Duthies brought the second action against the Gun Club,

that res judicata precluded the Gun Club from claiming that the Duthies' license was
revoked in the second litigation. ld., 105 Idaho at

663 P.2d at 289.

Tn finding that res judicata did not bar the Gun Club's argument that the Duthies' license
was revoked,

Duthie court cited res judicata precedent, including the following language
Co. v. Waller:

We think the COlTect rule to be that in an action between the same parties upon the same
claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to
every matter ofIe red and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to every
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.
Duthie, 104 Idaho at 753,663 P.3d at 289 (quoting Intermountain Food Equip. Co. v. Waller, 86

Idaho 94, 98, 383 P.2d 612, 615 (1963) (internal citations omitted»). The Duthie court then
determined that "because facts OCCUlTed subsequent to the first trial that triggered the filing of the
second suit, we hold that the issue of revocability was not ripe for trial in the first case, but
rather, was premature until the license was actually revoked." Id.
Duthie's facts are dramatically different than this case. In PA1C I, PMC undisputedly

claimed that Quail Ridge had breached the Ground Lease Agreement by not paying adjusted rent
in the amount of$416,812.50. (R Vol., pp. 218-63.) This is the same claim that was brought in

According to Justice Bistline's dissent in Duthie, the Gun Club made the propriety of the Duthies' connection an
issue in the first litigation. Duthie, 104 Idaho at 755, 663 P.2d at 291 (Bistline, J., dissenting).

3
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period. (ld., 9-17, 218-63.) Also, unlike Duthie, this case does not involve any question about
whether a claim "should" or "could" have been brought during the first lawsuit. This case
involves identical claims being brought in two separate lawsuits. This is not a situation where
there mayor may not be some cross over between the issues raised in the two lawsuits, which
was the thrust of Duthie. This is a straightforward situation where PMC sued, lost, and then sued
to

on

Res judicata

to deal with

exact case.

In the proceedings before the district court, PMC argued that "Judge Brown had already
opined from the bench in P Me 1 that a breach of contract claim could not be ripe until after the
court determined the amount of rent due under the lease and the tenant failed to promptly pay the
rents as adjusted by the court." (R Vol., pp. 425-29.) However, this statement ignores Judge
Brown's language from the bench after PMC's case-in-chief and upon Quail Ridge's motion for
a directed verdict on PMC's fIrst breach of contract claim when he said, "I would agree with Mr.
Gaffney that the evidence that was introduced yesterday was deficient in establishing that there
has been a breach of contract associated with this matter." (ld., p. 270.) It also ignores the fact
that Judge Brown never applied a "res judicata analytical rubric" to his decision to grant the
directed verdict motion.
Nothing that PMC can argue can circumvent the fact that PMC had its chance to present
evidence supporting the breach of contract claim during the PMe 1 trial. "[T]he fOlmer

Appellant Brief 18

matter

m

Equip,

('0,

104

first

at

663 P

v. Waller, 86 Idaho 94, 98, 383 P.2d 61

PMC

its choice

at

to

Intermountain

615 (1963) (internal citations omitted»).

it elected to bring its claim for breach of contract against Quail Ridge in

P MC I. In presenting its case-in-chiet: including its breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge

prior to dismissal of the breach claim, PMC offered the matter of its claim for breach of contract
by Quail Ridge. PMC should be made to face the ramifications of
by

PMC l. (See R Vol. 1,

procedural strategy, as

This Court should find that res

judicata precludes PMC from asserting its breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge and
reverse the district court.
Duthie is also bad law and the Court should take this opportunity and overturn it. In
Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 739 P.2d 290 (1987), Justice Bistline wrote:

The [Duthie] Court was then faced with the task of "discovering the COlTect theory." In
doing so, it had to work around its own concession that the law of res judicata was firmly
entrenched by prior Idaho cases, none of which were in the least equivocal.
Id., 112 Idaho at 998, 739 P.2d at 297 (Bistline, J., conculTing). In Olsen v. Olsen, 115 Idaho

105, 765 P.2d 130 (1988), he commented:
The doctrine of res judicata is still alive in Idaho although it suffered serious injury at the
hands of this Court in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983).
In that case a majority of this Court, over the protest of a strong dissent, emasculated
what had been until then one of the most strictly adhered to principles of Idaho
jurisprudence by declaring that the doctrine of res judicata need not be applied where the
circumstances were not "ripe," i, e., that after a judgment became wholly final, a second
suit involving the same issues previously litigated could nevertheless be brought,
provided that there was the interjection into the second law suit of some additional fact
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use water from a
Gun Club <o"",rprf'n

It would be a kindness to the trial bench and bar if two more votes were forthcoming to
erase any precedential effect which may otherwise some day be accorded it.

Id. at 108, 765 P.2d at 1

(Bistline 1., concurring, n.l).

D. Res judicata applies to the breaeh of eontract daim against Preston.
district court
PMC

when it failed to apply the legal doctrine of res judicata to the
Preston.

PMC

>b>'''~>'.J

sued Quail Ridge for breach of

obligation to pay rent under the Ground Lease Agreement, PMC should also have sued
Preston for breach of the guarantee. The guarantee claim was a claim that should have been
brought in the prior litigation. It was not asserted at any point by PMC. Thus, claim preclusion
applies not only to the parties of the original action but also to their privies. "To be a privy, 'a
person not a party to the former action must derive[] his interest from one who was a party to
it. '" Berkshire Investments, LLC, 278 P.3d at 951.
Here, Preston signed the guarantee as a part of the 2001 restructuring of the parties
agreements. (R Vol., p. 145.) Indeed, PMC's own claims against Preston assert that he is a
privy because PMC seeks to enforce the rent obligation vis-a.-vis the guarantee. (Id., pp. 9-17.)
Suing Quail Ridge in PMC I for breach of contract should have resulted in Preston being sued
under the guarantee. Yet, PMC I did not involve a claim on the guarantee. Claim preclusion
applies to claims brought or those claims that could have been brought in the prior litigation and
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on

The district court crred by not applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or
issue preclusion, to the claim against Preston on the personal guarantee.
Collateral

is "the doctrine that precludes relitigation of the same

ll1a

separate cause of action" and exists to protect "litigants from the burden of litigating an identical
issue with the same party or its privy." Vawter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1

Idaho 903, 318

P.3d 893, 902 (2014) (citing Rodriguez v. Dep'! (~lCorrection, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401,
403 (2001)). [n Vawter, the Court wrote:
Court has determined that five factors must be evident in order for collateral
an
determined a prior proceeding: (1) the pm1y
estoppel to bar
against whom the earlier decision was asseI1ed had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was
identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded
was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in
the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a pmiy or in
privity with a party to the litigation.
ld. at 903,318 P.3d at 902. The application of collateral estoppel is a legal question subject to
free review. Id. All five elements of collateral estoppel existed in this case. The Court should
reverse and remand for dismissal of the claim against Preston.
As discussed, supra, PMC could have, and should have, included its claim on the
guarantee in the prior litigation since it asserted that Quail Ridge did not pay the adjusted rent for
the 2010 rent adjustment period. Preston's guarantee can only be invoked

Quail Ridge failed to

meet its obligations. (R Vol. I, p. 145.) PMC sued Quail Ridge for breach ofthe Ground Lease
Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment period and PMC should have pursued the guarantee in
PMe I PMC chose not to do so. Thus, the first element of collateral estoppel applies.
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10 rent
case.

cases, PMC
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that Quail

Ground

Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment period by refusing to pay $416,812.50, after onsets.
Third, the issue of whether Quail Ridge breached the the Ground Lease Agreement was
decided in the prior litigation. (1£1., p. 263, 270.) Breach of contract was fully litigated.
Fourth, a final judgment was entered and the district court dismiss the breach of contract
in PMC [without qualification. (ld.)
as

action

breach of contract in PlvfC 1

have

included a claim against Preston on the guarantee. Judge Brown found that PMC had not
presented any evidence of breach of the Ground Lease Agreement and this should have barred
PMC from obtaining relief against Preston. (1£1.) By dismissing the breach of contract claim in
FMC 1, Judge Brown disposed of all grounds for invoking the guarantee against Preston.

F. The district court erred by awarding attorney fees and costs to PMC.
Obviously, if the Court vacates the district court's grant of summary judgment to PMC,
PMC will cease to be the overall prevailing party in the action because it will have acquired none
of the relief that it sought in the case. Quail Ridge and Preston will automatically become the
overall prevailing parties in the action as set forth, ir1fra. However, even if the Court finds that
the district court properly granted summary judgment to PMC, the Court should still reverse the
district court's decision to grant attorney fees and costs, including the amounts awarded.
"[AJ trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of
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v.

an
(2008).
One of the grounds cited by the district court for awarding attorney

to PMC was

Idaho Code Section 1 121. Ud., pp. 413-19.) The district court erred by awarding attorney fees
pursuant to this section of the code beause Quail Ridge and Preston presented the district court
with a legitimate argument based on the law, i.e., res judicata and collateral estoppeL Awarding
attorney

pursuant to Section 12-121 is inappropriate under those circumstances. Clearwater

LLCv.

1

318 P.3d 944,

(20

Quail

and

had a legitimate argument that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied and barred PMC from
alleging its breach of contract claim. This was a legal issue that the district court gave little
attention to when it decided the case. Its description of Quail Ridge and Preston's defense as
unreasonable unfairly characterizes their defense. Quail Ridge and Preston asserted legal
defenses to the lawsuit in good faith on the basis that PMC had previously sued for breach of
contract for the 2010 rent adjustment period. The Court should vacate the district court's
decision relying on Section 12-121 to award fees against Quail Ridge and Preston.
The district court erred because its decision on attorney fees does not state that the court
took into consideration the factors identified by Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Courts are required to consider the factors identified in the rule before making an
award of attorney fees. Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 833 P.2d 128
(Cl. App. 1992). The Court's decision never cites to Rule 54(e)(3) in its section awarding
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to
or

Court

6.

it

a

"'When

court must

nlctors set Corth in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that the court deems
appropriate.' (citations omitted). Though it is not necessary for the court to address all of the
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) tllctors in writing, the record must clearly indicate the court considered all of
the factors. Id" Id, 146 Idaho at

196 P.3d at 350-51. Allowing district courts the leeway

to not consider the Rule 54(e)(3) factors is contrary to the entire meaning of that rule, which is to
the
Idaho

of

impacts

fees. See

v. Leltunich,

435, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005). The district court abused its discretion by not

considering the Rule 54(e)(3) factors because such conduct is not consistent with the applicable
legal standard. Johannsen, 146 Idaho at 432, 196 P.3d at 350 (citing In re Jane Doe, 145 Idaho
650,651,182 P.3d 707, 708 (2008)). The amounts awarded are an abuse of discretion.
The district court erred when it award $1,13 5 .18 in discretionary costs to PMC for legal
research. These costs were not exceptional and should not have been awarded in the interests of
justice. Legal research is an ordinary cost incurred by attomeys in every case that they take.
Every case that results in litigation involves legal research to support motions or to oppose
motions. Such costs are not exceptional but are routine costs that are a part of the overhead of
running a law firm. In re Beach, 2011 WL 4963003, *8 (Bankr. D. Idaho October 19,2011).
Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by awarding PMC its costs for legal research.
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on appeal.
matter
case will be

on

Quail
there will

nothing left to litigate on remand. They will be the overall prevailing parties in a claim involving
a commercial transaction. They will also have prevailed in an appeal involving a contract with an
attorney

provision. Therefore, the Court should award Quail Ridge and Preston attorney fees

and costs in addition to reversing the district court
Idaho follows the American Rule which entitles a party to attorney fees only when there
is a contract or statute

for an award

attorney fees. Mortensen v. Stewart Title Ouar.

Co., 149 Idaho 437, 447-48,235 P.3d 387,397-98 (2010). Idaho Code 12-121 entitles a
prevailing party to its attorney fees when a case is prosecuted frivolously, unreasonably, or
without any basis in law or fact. See IDAIIO CODE ANN. § 12-121 (2013). Where a party knows or
should know that res judicata will bar the action, further litigation is frivolous. Burns v. Baldwin,
138 Idaho 480, 487, 65 P.3d 502,509 (2003); Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 558, 768 P.2d
815, 821 (Ct. App. 1989). Here, PMC brought a frivolous and unreasonable case against Quail
Ridge and Preston because the claim for breach of contract had already been litigated in P!vIC l.
(R Vol. I, pp. 263, 270.) Quail Ridge avoided all liability on the breach of contract claim in P1VfC
l. (Id.) Reversing the district court's findings in this case and ordering a dismissal results in Quail

Ridge and Preston prevailing and being entitled to fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for attorney fees in cases where the gravamen of
the action is a commercial transaction. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120(3). The parties are in a
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that

could

for

case. Such a

would mean that they are

overall prevailing party in the action. Eighteen Mile Ranch. LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving,

Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). In Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, the Court
likened the avoidance of liability to getting a walk in a game of baseball. Id. The Court wrote:
A voiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant.
baseball, it is said that a walk
is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, avoiding liability
is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is,
while a plaintiff with a large money judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who
walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not
value of a
successful defense.

Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at
133. Thus, by avoiding liability in a lawsuit involving a commercial transaction, Quail Ridge and
Preston "walked" and should be awarded their attorney fees.

V. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Based on the foregoing, Quail Ridge and Preston request that the Court vacate the
Amended Final Judgment entered by the Court. The Court should reverse its grant of summary
judgment to PMC and order that the district court enter judgment in favor of Quail Ridge and
Preston, dismissing the case with prejudice. The Court should award Quail Ridge and Preston
their full, reasonable attorney fees and costs as set forth above.

III
III
III
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